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IS  TH ERE AN ANSW ER TO SOCRATES’  PUZZLE? 
INDIVIDUALITY, UNIVERSALITY, A ND TH E SELF 
IN PLATO’S PHAEDRUS  
Voula TSOUNA 
University of California at Santa Barbara 
RÉSUMÉ. Cet article est ma contribution au débat sur la nature du moi idéal chez 
Platon ; débat commencé dans l’antiquité, mais qui se poursuit jusqu’à aujourd’hui. 
Les positions sont à peu près les suivantes. D’un côté, à la suite du platonicien 
Numénius, de nombreux interprètes (que j’appellerai universalistes) soutiennent 
que, puisque le moi chez Platon est un élément rationnel immatériel, ce ne peut 
être un moi personnel et individuel, mais il doit être impersonnel et universel. 
Dans cette perspective, l’âme contemplative n’est pas à proprement parler un moi ; 
elle se confond plutôt, selon les termes du Premier Alcibiade – un texte clé pour les 
universalistes – avec « Dieu et la sagesse » (Alc. 133c). De l’autre côté, quelques 
commentateurs (que j’appellerai individualistes ou particularistes) suivent Plotin 
et supposent ou affirment l’individualité du moi platonicien. Mais, à la différence 
de Plotin, les particularistes n’ont jamais reconnu qu’il y a là matière à controverse 
et n’ont jamais réellement affronté le problème de savoir de quelle façon le moi est 
individuel et ce que son individualité pourrait impliquer. C’est donc une nouvelle 
défense de l’individualité du moi que je présente ici. En outre, je suggère que son 
individualité n’est pas incompatible avec la sorte d’universalité qu’implique la 
contemplation et même qu’elle constitue une précondition de sa propre trans-
cendance. Cependant, mon argumentation se tient dans les limites du Phèdre ; je 
ne prétends pas tirer de conclusions pour l’ensemble du corpus platonicien. Dans la 
première partie, j’expose l’aporie à laquelle est confronté Socrate, l’énigme qui 
motive l’enquête qui va suivre ; j’avance également l’hypothèse que les deux dis-
cours qui précèdent le Grand Discours de Socrate, sa palinodie – le premier étant 
censément composé par Lysias, le second par Socrate –, frayent la voie à la pali-
nodie elle-même en avançant des conceptions rivales de l’amour-eros, de la connais-
sance de soi et de la rationalité. Dans la seconde partie, je défends une lecture 
particulariste de la palinodie et plus spécialement du mythe sur la nature de l’âme. 
SUMMARY. This paper is a contribution to a debate that has its origins in antiquity 
and still continues to this day, which concerns the nature of the ideal self in Plato and 
which takes roughly the following form.  On the one hand, following the Platonist 
philosopher Numenius, many interpreters (which I call universalists) maintain that, 
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since the self in Plato is an immaterial rational element, it cannot be personal and 
individual, but must be impersonal and universal.  According to this approach, the 
contemplative soul is not, strictly speaking, a self, but rather, in the phrasing of the first 
Alcibiades which is a key text for the universalists, is indistinguishable from ‘god and 
wisdom’ (Alc. 133c).  On the other hand, some scholars (which I call individualists or 
particularists) follow Plotinus in assuming or asserting the individuality of Platonic 
selves.  But, unlike Plotinus, particularists have never acknowledged that the issue is 
controversial and have never really confronted the problem of how the self is indivi-
dual or what its individuality might imply.  Therefore I defend afresh the individual-
ity of the self.  Moreover, I suggest that it is not incompatible with the sort of universal-
ity involved in contemplation but, in fact, constitutes a presupposition for achieving 
transcendence.  However, my argument is restricted to the Phaedrus alone and does 
not purport to draw conclusions regarding the entire Platonic corpus.  In Part I I pre-
sent Socrates’ aporia, the puzzle which motivates the forthcoming search; also I suggest 
that the two speeches preceding Socrates’ Great Speech or palinode, one supposedly by 
Lysias and the other by Socrates, pave the ground for the palinode itself by advancing 
competing conceptions of erotic love, self-knowledge and rationality.  In Part II I argue 
for a particularist reading of the palinode and especially of the myth concerning the 
nature of the soul.  
   
 
Plato’s Phaedrus is a notoriously complex and intriguing work.  It is cast 
as a conversation between Socrates and his friend Phaedrus taking place in 
the country outside the city walls – an unlikely location for Socrates, who 
tells us elsewhere that he never left Athens unless compelled by duty to do 
so (Crito 52d).  Also uncharacteristic is Socrates’ declaration that he is ‘a 
man sick with passion for hearing speeches’ (228b), and that he followed 
Phaedrus to the countryside precisely in order to hear him read a speech by 
the great Athenian orator Lysias on eros, love.  As it turns out, eros, here 
homoerotic love between an older man who plays the role of the lover and 
the youth who is his beloved, is the first of the three apparently disconnec-
ted themes of which the dialogue consists.  The first part contains three 
speeches on eros, one by Lysias and two by Socrates (227a-257b), while the 
second part concerns the correct composition and use of rhetorical spee-
ches (257c-274b) and the third part draws the famous comparison between 
oral and written speech and explores the conditions for their proper use 
(274b-278e). Whatever the verdict on the vexed question of the unity of 
the Phaedrus,1 arguably, one scarlet thread that runs through all three 
parts2 is yet another issue articulated by Socrates in the prologue (229e-
230a), namely the pressing need to understand the self.  
That endeavour is most prominent and explicit in the first part of the 
dialogue, and especially in the so-called palinode, Socrates’ so-called Great 
Speech composed in the form of both argument and myth, which famously 
compares the soul to a team of winged horses and their charioteer and 
suggests that the former correspond to lower, non-rational elements of the 
soul, whereas the latter represents the higher element, namely reason.  Also, 
the myth of the palinode narrates the experiences of souls, human or 
divine, as they travel in the heavens, as well as the deeds and sufferings of  
human souls when they fall towards the earth and enter some body; and it 
 
1. Scholars disagree as to whether the Phaedrus is a unified work or what its unity con-
sists in.  See, for instance, Baron 1891; Helmbold & Holther 1952; Rowe 1986; Heath 
1989a, and also Heath 1989b; and Rowe 1989. 
2. So Griswold 1986, passim. An extensive bibliography on the topic of self-knowledge 
in Plato is cited at the end of that volume. A more general treatment of the topic of self-
knowledge in Plato is found in Ballard 1965. 
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advances a certain conception of the soul and the self through the allego-
rical analysis of a distinctly human phenomenon, love.  The opening phrase 
of the Phaedrus indicates, I suggest, just where the centre of gravity of the 
entire dialogue lies:  ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν, where to and where from.3  Osten-
sibly, the question concerns Phaedrus, who answers it promptly.  However, 
the two adverbs also foreshadow the narrative concerning the souls’ travels 
at the heavenly place from which they come to earth and to which they 
desire to return.4  One central assumption of the story, as I shall argue, is 
that the soul is the self and, therefore, understanding the soul implies 
understanding the nature of the self and gaining the relevant kind of self-
knowledge or self-understanding. 
Similar claims are advanced or presupposed in other dialogues as well.  
In particular, the Apology emphasises the paramount moral importance of 
the soul and indicates the intrinsic relation between the soul and the self, 
whereas the Charmides and the first Alcibiades, in different ways, have 
appeared to move away from a conception of the self as something subject-
ive, but try to define the self and self-knowledge in objective terms.5  Espe-
cially the Alcibiades has been considered to come closest to the formulation 
of the view that, ultimately, the self is not subjective and personal or indivi-
dual, but rather objective and impersonal or universal.  For not only does 
the dialogue identify the self as the soul, but also it maintains that knowing 
oneself is knowing the divine element in oneself which rules the body and, 
ultimately, transcends the individuality connected with the body either in 
an epistemic sense or in an ontological sense or both.  For philosophical 
reasons, therefore, and regardless of whether it was authored by Plato,6 the 
 
3. The same conclusion is suggested by Rowe 1986 on different grounds. On his ac-
count, the first two speeches of the Phaedrus prepare for the palinode, whereas the second 
and the third parts of the dialogue look back and comment on it. 
4. On the philosophical significance of Plato’s prologues and in particular the first 
words of each dialogue, see Burnyeat 1997. 
5. See Tsouna 2001. 
6. The authorship of the first Alcibiades or Alcibiades Major is notoriously difficult to 
settle and is still debated today. My confidence in its authenticity has been strengthened in 
the light of the considerations advanced by Denyer 2001, 14-26. As Denyer and others 
point out (cf. e.g. Annas 1985), in antiquity no one ever doubted that Plato wrote the 
Alcibiades, but the work was frequently read and frequently cited as « the gateway to the 
temple » of Plato’s dialogues (see Denyer 2001, 14). Denyer persuasively rejects attempts to 
deny the authenticity of the dialogue on grounds either of similarities with other works by 
Plato or of differences from them (op. cit.:  15-17), indicates the insufficiency of stylometric 
tests for such purposes (17-20), and shows how developmentalist assumptions might lead 
one to question the authorship of the Alcibiades (20-24). However, my argument does not 
depend crucially on the assumption that the Alcibiades is by Plato. For, in any case, the 
Alcibiades clearly belongs to the Platonic tradition and has been read in antiquity as an 
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Alcibiades constitutes an important point of reference for my purposes.  
The same holds for the Charmides as well, which suggests that the self is 
identical with something impersonal and objective, i.e., knowledge or the 
knowing element, although it subsequently raises doubts concerning the 
self-referential nature of self-knowledge.  On the other hand, although the 
present study contains, inevitably, material pertaining to the psychology of 
the Phaedrus, it will not engage in depth with the literature on that subject 
or with relevant comparisons between the account of the soul in the pali-
node and the views about the soul explored in the Phaedo and the Repu-
blic.7  For these topics have been addressed in great detail in the literature 
and, in any case, the primary concern of this paper is less with psychology as 
such and more with questions pertaining to the metaphysics of the self and 
self-knowledge.8 
The central thesis of this paper is that, although the Great Speech of the 
Phaedrus presents continuities with the Charmides and the Alcibiades, as 
well as with the Phaedo and other dialogues, concerning the self and self-
knowledge, nonetheless it makes a fresh start by advancing, as I shall argue, 
the following positions.  The soul is the self, conceived individually and not 
in some other manner.  Each soul, human or divine, preserves its individu-
ality both in its discarnate state in the heavens and in its incarnate state on 
earth.  The individual and personal character of the soul is preserved in im-
portant ways even in the very act of contemplation, when the soul appre-
 
important commentary on the nature of the self and the importance of self-knowledge. 
Hence, I shall use it as a point of reference when I consider it useful to do so, in a way that is 
neutral regarding the vexed question of its authorship. 
7. I assume with the majority of interpreters that the Phaedrus postdates the Phaedo, 
the Republic, and the Symposium. Moreover, it has been plausibly argued that the myth of 
the palinode is in important respects close to Plato’s later views found, notably, in the Laws: 
see Bett 1986. 
8. Authors generally agree that the human soul as depicted in the Phaedrus is marked by 
considerable tension between the higher, rational element and the lower, non-rational 
elements. However, they generate and interpret the tension in different ways and they draw 
different conclusions about the possibility for humans to resolve the conflict between the 
aims of the three parts of the soul and to live the philosophical life. For example, one 
interpreter proposes that the Phaedrus abandons the asceticism of earlier dialogues in favour 
of a fairly optimistic picture of the human soul, according to which the non-rational parts of 
the soul supply reason with the motivation to engage in philosophy as well as with impor-
tant insights into the nature of Beauty, and it is possible for reason and the lower elements 
to work together towards achieving inner harmony (M.C. Nussbaum, « “This story isn’t 
true” : Madness, Reason, and Recantation in the Phaedrus », in Nussbaum 1986, 200-233). 
On the contrary, other interpreters argue that the tensions in the human soul are insoluble 
and the best humans can hope for is to suppress the non-rational elements and devote 
themselves to philosophy at the expense of the lower parts of the soul (see, most recently, 
Obdrzalek 2012). 
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hends Forms.  However, the individuality of the soul qua soul (which I call 
metaphysical individuality) is quite distinct from the individuality typically 
associated with the body9 (which I call empirical individuality).  Strictly 
speaking, I shall maintain, only metaphysical individuality designates the 
self; on the other hand, empirical individuality, which is related to the 
lower element of the soul, is not one of the constituents of selfhood.  More-
over, I shall contend, the palinode strongly suggests that the individuality 
of the soul is a precondition or a presupposition for achieving  transcend-
ence.  This latter notion is defined not in terms of the strict assimilation of 
the self with the Forms suggested in the Alcibiades, but rather in terms of 
the ability of the rational part of the soul to reach out and contemplate the 
Forms.  Both individuality and transcendence are crucial to the explanation 
of the phenomenon that the palinode ostensibly aims to explain, namely 
eros. 
In virtue of defending the above claims, this paper can be read as a con-
tribution to a debate that began in antiquity and still continues to this day, 
which concerns the nature of the ideal self and takes, in bare outline, the 
following form.  On the one hand, a large group of interpreters (I call them 
universalists) defend in different ways the thesis that, since the self in Plato 
is an immaterial rational element (the driver in the simile of the Phaedrus), 
it cannot be personal but must be impersonal or, as it is often put, it cannot 
be individual but has to be universal.  For, the reasoning goes, since the self 
does not comprise the body and since individuality only pertains to the 
body, it follows that the self has no individuality but is something universal 
and abstract; or, considered in its contemplative activity alone, the soul is 
nothing distinct and independent from the universal objects of 
contemplation.  In other words, the contemplative soul is not, strictly spea-
king, a self, but rather, in the phrasing of the Alcibiades which is a key text 
for the universalists, is indistinguishable from ‘god and wisdom’ (Alc. 
133c), the divine mind and its contents.  Numenius was probably the first 
to have defended this view, which has been revived in the last several deca-
des by representatives of both the continental and the anglo-american 
traditions.10  On the other hand, a smaller group of scholars (I call them 
 
9. E.g. this is the case with the Phaedo and also the Alcibiades. 
10. Proponents of some version of the universalist view comprise, notably, Pierre Hadot 
(see, for instance, Hadot 1993, especially 38-41; Hadot 1995, especially 94-99, 102-103, 
242-243); Brunschwig 1996; Duncan 1942; and, most recently, Fossheim 2010. A nuanced 
approach is found in Sorabji 2006, especially 33-35, 115-117. Narcy 2008 offers a most 
enlightening discussion of the issue whether and in what sense Plato has a notion of the self. 
Also, he argues that, in the Timaeus, the distinction between a mortal and an immortal kind 
of soul, as well as the identification of the immortal kind of soul with an immortal daimon 
within us, strongly suggests that the real self, namely what is immortal in oneself, is not 
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individualists or particularists) choose to follow Plotinus, who rejects 
Numenius’ interpretation in favour of the view that the rational self is 
individual and gives his own reason for that thesis, namely that the self is 
individual because it exemplifies an individual form (Enn. V.7; cf. also IV.3, 
1-8).11  But even though the particularists assume or assert the individuality 
of Platonic selves, to my knowledge they never acknowledge that the issue 
is controversial and never really confront the problem of just how the self is 
individual or what this might imply.  Therefore, I intend to defend anew 
the individuality of the self; and I also intend to suggest, as mentioned 
above, that the individuality of the self or soul is not incompatible with the 
kind of universality and transcendence involved in contemplation, but 
rather constitutes a presupposition for attaining it.  However, my argument 
concerns the Phaedrus alone and does not purport to draw conclusions 
regarding the entire Platonic corpus.  
The paper has two parts.  In Part I, I present Socrates’ aporia, the puzzle 
which motivates the forthcoming search; also I propose that the two 
speeches preceding the palinode, one supposedly by Lysias, the other by 
Socrates, pave the ground for the Great Speech by advancing competing 
conceptions of erotic love, self-knowledge, and rationality.  In Part II, 
which constitutes the core of the paper, I argue for a particularist reading of 
the palinode and especially of the myth concerning the nature of the soul. 
I  
Socrates sets the philosophical agenda inadvertently, when he rejects for 
himself the usual endeavour of sophoi, wise men (229c), to give a rational 
account of myths and mythical figures (229c-e), stating that his chief pro-
blem is to understand his own self . 
I have no time at all for such things.  And the reason, my friend, is this.  I 
am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it 
 
really oneself but rather an immortal principle given by God.  Most recently, Fossheim 2010 
outlines the central thesis of his paper in the following terms:  ‘What I am going to suggest is 
that a central topic of the Phaedrus is the human soul as non-individual soul.  That is, 
whether or not there might be something like a world soul as a separate principle in addition 
to each individual human soul, the human soul is not simply the eternally moving principle 
of an individual entity.  In the Phaedrus, Plato invites us to explore soul not as a principle of 
individuality, but of community and of identity over and above individuality’ (49). 
11. An excellent discussion of this position is found in Kalligas 1997, who engages with 
much of the relevant literature.  However, particularists do not need to endorse the view 
that the self is individual because it exemplifies an individual form.  Another way of indivi-
duating the soul could be to conceive of it as an individual set of causal powers.  See also n. 
63.  
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really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have under-
stood that.  And so I do not concern myself with these matters and, accept-
ing what is generally believed about them, as I was just saying, I investigate 
not these things but myself:  Am I a beast more complicated and savage 
than Typho, or am I a gentler and simpler animal on account of the fact 
that12 some divine and serene lot is given to it by nature? (229e-230a). 
Immediately before the speech competition, then, Socrates states his 
chief preoccupation, harking back to the Apology.  In both places he dissoci-
ates himself from the sophoi, the wise men, and their intellectual pursuits, 
appeals to the Delphic command, and acknowledges the paramount impor-
tance of self-understanding over every other achievement that he might 
have aspired to.13  Differently from the way in which he conducts the 
search for self-knowledge in the Apology, however, in the Phaedrus he 
frames it as a theoretical enquiry concerning the nature of the human self.  
To understand who he is, Socrates suggests, he must understand what kind 
of animal he is.  In fact, the two questions are presented as parts of the same 
enquiry:  in so far as Socrates is a man, he will know himself if and only if he 
gets to know what kind of thing man is.  As I understand the reference to 
Typho, the above passage outlines two alternatives, ontological as well as 
psychological:  either man is a supremely complex and savage beast,14 or he 
is a simpler and gentler kind of creature on account of the fact, precisely, 
that he naturally has a share in something divine.  So, the comparison 
emphasises not only that Typho is a three-part monster, ‘part-man, part-
animal, feathered all over, much like the part-human, part-equine feathered 
souls of the palinode’,15 but also, importantly, that it is a beast most forceful 
and savage.  If Socrates’ dilemma is to be settled, it will be necessary to 
provide some general account of the self and of human nature.  As it turns 
out, he will do the exact opposite of what the sophoi, the wise men, do.  
While the latter rationalise the content of myths, Socrates will mythologise 
the answer to a philosophical problem. 
 
12. Cf. the participle μετέχον (230a), which I take to have causal force.  See my inter-
pretation of the metaphor immediately below. 
13. For later Platonists, this passage constitutes the reference text for the idea that the 
knowledge of oneself constitutes the necessary prerequisite for every other kind of know-
ledge.  See, for instance, Olympiodorus in Alc. 10-11 Westerink. 
14. Note the exact terms of the comparison in 230a:  Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλ-
λον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, more complex and savage or furious than Typho. 
15. Obdrzalek 2012, 83.  Obdrzalek also suggests that Typho evokes the comparison of 
the soul to a man tethered to a many-headed beast in the Republic (588b-589b) and argues 
that, in the Phaedrus as well as in the Republic, these metaphors yield a pessimistic picture of 
the human lot. 
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At first glance, the two speeches that follow have no explicit connection 
with Socrates’ puzzle.  They appear to bear on an altogether different sub-
ject, eros, erotic love, or rather, to be exact, the alleged absence of eros in a 
suitor and the benefits that that absence will bring to the boy he is trying to 
seduce.  In fact, I shall argue, they engage us gradually with the enquiry into 
the nature of the self, for they illustrate in turn two different conceptions 
of the self that underlie, respectively, the attitudes of their speakers towards 
eros.  Each of these conceptions also involves certain assumptions about 
rationality, self-control and self-knowledge. 
The first speech is attributed to Lysias (228d-e), but there is no doubt 
in my mind that, in truth, it is Plato’s own composition.16  According to 
Phaedrus (227c), its principal merit lies in the paradoxical position that the 
speaker defends with some skill, namely, that it is better for a youth to give 
his favours to someone who, like the speaker himself, is not in love with the 
youth than to someone who is.  Adopting throughout a tone both unemo-
tional and pragmatic, the non-lover tries to convince the boy that the rela-
tion he proposes is to their mutual benefit (cf. συμφέρει:  230e):  he will get 
what he needs (ὧν δέομαι:  231a; cf. also 232d), and the boy will receive in 
return his lasting friendship (cf. φίλοι:  233a) and his benevolent concern 
for the youth’s future advantage (ὠφελίαν:  233c).  Unlike any lover, the 
non-lover is not pushed into the relationship by the force of his feelings but 
freely chooses to enter it, and hence he does not repent for what he has 
offered to the object of his affection when his passion ceases to exist (231a).  
He does not neglect his own affairs, and then blame the boy for the damage 
(231a-b).  He does not lose his mind nor does he experience his passion as a 
sickness from which he is going to recover (231d).  He won’t be indiscreet, 
thus exposing his younger partner to gossip and slander (231e-232b).  He 
won’t raise obstacles to the youth’s education and improvement nor to his 
integration into society (323b ff.).  He won’t be fickle, unpredictable, or 
intolerant (231d, 233c), nor will he turn sour after the erotic relationship 
ends.  But the opposite things apply to men who fall in love and who, 
therefore, are bound to be harmful to the object of their erotic passion (cf. 
231a-233c passim). 
 
16. For example, see Shorey 1933, who argues that the speech is a caricature of Lysias’ 
style by pointing to evidence of conscious parody in the use of the particles.  As Shorey 
points out (op. cit. 131), regarding the authenticity of the speech, the one side of the debate 
argues that Plato could imitate any style, whereas the other affirms that he would not have 
applied his criticism of Lysias upon an invention of his own.  In fact, Plato often exercises 
his criticisms upon his own inventions:  the refutation of Protagoras’ ‘Great Speech’ in the 
Protagoras and the rebuttal of the ‘subtler philosophers’ in the Theaetetus are cases at hand. 
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Indeed, it would be hard to imagine a more uninspiring and uninspired 
love-speech (λόγος ἐρωτικός:  227c).17  In fact, it does not seem to be about 
love at all, if eros implies what we are told it implies, i.e., losing oneself to 
love (231d).  Likewise, the rhetoric of the speech is anti-rhetorical in its 
effect.18  Neither the detached and business-like style nor the cost-benefit 
analysis proposed would be likely to convince anyone, let alone a very 
young person, to enter a relationship of this sort.  The reason why the 
suitor does not use the language of love is simply, I suggest, that he feels no 
such thing.  Nor does he give any indication that he is insincere regarding 
that disclaimer.  On the contrary, there is ample reason to believe that, 
when he says that he does not love the youth, he speaks the plain truth.  
However, it seems difficult to square the non-lover’s endeavour to satisfy 
his own needs (231a, 232d) with his assurances that he does not desire the 
boy’s body regardless of his character (232e), that he does not think of 
immediate pleasure but rather19 of the boy’s good (232b), and that he 
would act as a φίλος, a friend, towards the boy by advising him correctly and 
by improving his character (233a).  For given that he is not in love, what 
reason might he have for approaching the boy other than sexual grati-
fication?  What kind of φιλία might he have developed?  And, given his tho-
roughly utilitarian approach, why should we believe that he would give pri-
ority to the boy’s benefit over the fullfilment of his own desire? 
Overall, I suggest, the non-lover comes across as a pedestrian man, cold 
and calculating, arrogant about his own merits and deserts (cf. 232d-e, 
233d, 234a), smug about his supposed excellence (232d-e) and his self-
control (233c), ruthless about manipulating the boy’s fears of social expo-
sure and personal hurt (231e-232b, 234a-b), speaking frankly about his 
lack of eros but perhaps not so frankly about what it might entail.20  So-
crates implicitly points to some of these features in his criticism of Lysias’ 
style, when he remarks that the non-lover repeats the same things several 
times over ‘as if he really did not have much to say about the subject, almost 
as if he just were not very interested in it’ (235a).  Generally, we get the 
feeling that, contrary to the impression that he strives to create, in fact the 
non-lover focuses on his own desires and perceives the boy in an 
instrumental manner, as a means to his own pleasure.  And since he sug-
gests to the boy that any deserving non-lover will do for the boy’s needs (cf. 
 
17. See Hackforth 1952, ad loc. 
18. See Rosen 1969, 432. 
19. I take the καί as emphatic:  see Nehamas & Woodruff 1995, ad loc.  Compare the 
translation of Fowler 1914, 431:  ‘not with a view to present pleasure only, but to future 
advantage also’ (my emphasis). 
20. See the inconsistency mentioned in the previous paragraph. 
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233e-234b), we may infer that something similar applies to himself:  any  
youth will do for his own needs, provided that he has the right age (ὥρας:  
234a) and that there are no hedonistic or utilitarian reasons against that 
choice. 
The above picture yields, I submit, a certain conception of the self.  For 
the non-lover identifies himself primarily by reference to his sexual drives, 
his external qualities, and his social skills, in short, things that have to do 
with the body.  Correspondingly, he views the boy as an object of sexual but 
not erotic desire,21 a potential receiver of profits in exchange for his favours, 
a partner in a relation of φιλία, friendship, as opposed to eros, mutually cul-
tivated for the physical, material or social advantage of each member of the 
pair.  His effort to remain dispassionate and objective regarding his self-
presentation in the speech highlights, in a paradoxical manner, his indivi-
duality and egoism:  a kind of individuality related to the body and its de-
sires, and a concern for oneself of a sort that excludes genuine concern for 
the boy.  Moreover, there is no trace of any wish or ability to transcend his 
individual point of view and the boundaries of physical desire.22  As to the 
boy, I suggest that in the eyes of the non-lover he is mainly his body.  For 
there is no mention of any specific feature that would single out this boy 
from other boys of his age and would explain the non-lover’s preference for 
him.  It is striking that the suitor refers to the boy’s bloom (234a, b), but 
not once does he mention his beauty.  And although he talks in a general 
way about  the boy’s manner (232e) and character (233a), he never alludes 
to his psyche, soul. 
Given the kind of self that the non-lover appears to be or to have, 
whatever self-knowledge he possesses must be of a very superficial kind.  He 
knows that he is not in love and that he is in control of himself.  He is 
aware of the profitable consequences of his self-control:  e.g., he is not likely 
to neglect his own affairs (231b), impair his practical judgement (cf. 233a-
b), or behave in an indiscreet and indecorous manner (cf. 232a).  Let us 
even concede that he knows that he will be generous and benevolent to the 
youth after he gains his favours, and that he will remain so after the relation 
ends.  More importantly, the non-lover knows what he wants and one way 
in which he may be able to get it:  he desires the boy and speaks well in 
order to seduce him.  However, he shows no trace of self-awareness deri-
ving from deeper reflection on the nature of his desire.  Nor does he give us 
reason to believe that he could really account for it.  Equally superficial is 
 
21. On this distinction, and also on the reification of the boy, see Rosen 1969, 433. 
22. For example, see Brunschwig 1996.  In the second part of the present article, I shall 
suggest a different sense of individuality, which can pertain to the soul, discarnate or incar-
nate. 
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his view of what counts as a rational course of action, sound reasoning, or 
mental health (cf. 231d):  e.g., the arguments that he presents to the boy 
consist, in effect, of means-ends reasoning whose ultimate purpose is to 
attain the goal of physical desire.23  Therefore, it would seem that, if per 
impossibile the non-lover were faced with Socrates’ dilemma, he would have 
to conclude that he is closer to beasthood than to divinity. 
A very different conception of selfhood emerges from Socrates’ attempt 
to offer a counterspeech more complete and more valuable than Lysias’ (cf. 
235b) on the same subject (237a-241d).  He too presents a non-lover try-
ing to attract the youth of his choice (237b), and he too retains in his own 
speech Lysias’ central assumption, namely that the non-lover should be 
praised for his sanity and self-control, whereas the lover should be blamed 
for the absence of these qualities (235e-236a).24  Nonetheless, these simila-
rities between Socrates’ and Lysias’ speeches are undermined, I propose, by 
the fact that Socrates’ non-lover is actually a concealed lover (237b) who 
pretends that he is not in love with the youth for reasons that remain un-
stated.  Hence the question arises whether he really is in his right mind (cf. 
σωφροσύνη:  237e) and how that state could be reconciled with his being in 
love.  From the point of view of style, Socrates’ speech displays precisely the 
artful characteristics that, according to Socrates, Lysias’ composition lacks, 
notably, a systematic analysis and classification by means of collection and 
division, an orderly development of the reasoning, and a correct arrange-
ment and organic unity of different parts (cf. 262c-264e).25  From the point 
of view of content, I wish to argue, the concealed lover appears to conceive 
of himself and of the object of his affection in a entirely new way, which is 
related to his own definition of the nature and intentionality of eros. 
From the very start, this speech has a pedagogical dimension.  The con-
cealed lover advises the youth26 as to how to deliberate well about any mat-
ter including, of course, the present one (237b-c):  the decision ought to be 
made on the basis of knowledge of, and agreement about, the true nature 
(οὐσία) of a given subject, for in the opposite case the discussants will end 
up disagreeing with themselves as well as each other (237b-c).  Hence, he 
suggests, to settle the present issue, i.e., whether a boy should befriend a 
 
23. On many accounts, the lower parts of the city and the soul in the Republic can 
engage in this kind of reasoning: see for instance Kahn 1987; and Cooper 1999. A different 
view is advanced, notably, by Lorenz 2004. 
24. Phaedrus’ reformulation of that presupposition is weaker:  ‘I will allow you to pre-
suppose that the lover is more insane than the non-lover’ (236b; my emphasis). 
25. Also, Socrates suggests that Lysias’ speech does not express a clear attitude towards 
its own subject:  it is not clear just what Lysias wants to achieve or how he wants to speak.  
26. Cf. μειρακίσκος, a very young man, to be distinguished from παῖς, a boy (237b). 
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lover or a non-lover, there is need to define ‘what kind of thing eros is and 
what power it has’ (237c).  Namely, eros, love, is a kind of desire, which can-
not be singled out, however, as the desire for beautiful people27, for lovers 
and non-lovers both do desire beautiful people.  Rather the relevant dis-
tinction is between two different principles in us, the one inborn and the 
other acquired, the former determined as a desire for pleasures, the latter as 
a belief or opinion (δόξα) which aims at what is best (237d-e).  These desi-
res often conflict with each other with the result that one of them prevails:  
when the former prevails it leads us unthinkingly to pleasure, whereas 
when belief gains control it guides us through reasoning to the good (237e-
238a).  The case of eros is, precisely, a desire of the former kind, which over-
comes rational opinion and compels us to take pleasure in beauty (ἡδονὴν 
κάλλους:  238c), and which acquires additional force from its kindred desi-
res for beauty in human bodies (ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος:  238c). 
In the sequel of the speech, the concealed lover relies on the distinctions 
drawn above to show to the boy the bad consequences of yielding to a lover 
intent on pleasure, as opposed to a non-lover desiring what is best.  He 
argues that, precisely because the former is a slave to pleasure, he will endea-
vour to turn the boy into the kind of object that will give him as much 
pleasure as possible, i.e., a weak and inferior creature unlikely to resist the 
demands of the older man (238e-239a).  In particular, that kind of lover 
will raise obstacles to the boy’s proper physical development (239c-d); es-
trange him from his family and friends (239e-240a); envy him on account 
of his wealth or possessions (240a); disgust and suffocate the youth by 
clinging to him at all times (240a-d); and finally hurt and betray his belo-
ved when he falls out of love (239a-241c).  However, by far the greatest 
damage concerns the lad’s intellectual and psychological development:  he 
will be kept away from worthy people and especially from ‘that which 
would do most to make him wise, namely divine philosophy’ (239b).  For 
this reason above all, the pleasure-seeking lover should be judged to be 
‘absolutely devastating to the cultivation of the soul, which truly is, and will 
always be, the most valuable thing to gods and men’ (241c). 
Unlike Lysias’ non-lover, then, the concealed lover acts more like a 
mentor than like a suitor.  First, in addition to good oratorical form, his 
speech exhibits a method of sound deliberation which in fact overlaps, as 
Socrates makes clear later in the dialogue, with the proper composition of a 
speech.  Namely, I propose, the concealed lover applies the method later 
identified in terms of ‘divisions and collections’ (266b), which is useful for 
 
27. Given the context, I prefer to translate τῶν καλῶν (237d) as ‘beautiful people’, rather 
than ‘the beautiful’ (H.N. Fowler 1914) or ‘what is beautiful’ (Nehamas & Woodruff 
1995). 
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instruction (265d) and serves here to individuate and also denounce ‘the 
left-handed’ kind of love (266a), as opposed to the ‘right-handed’ kind 
praised in the palinode (266a-b).28  Assuming that ‘divisions and collec-
tions’ constitute the object of dialectic (cf. 266c), and given that the 
concealed lover appears reasonably well versed in it, he is either an expert 
‘dialectician’, as Socrates would call him (266c), or at least a lover of ‘divi-
sions and collections’, like Socrates himself (266b).  Second, the concealed 
lover claims that the dialectical method is useful for decision-making 
because it conveys ‘knowledge of the true nature of a particular subject’ 
(237c), which constitutes the basis of the subsequent investigation.  Accor-
ding to Socrates’ commentary in the second part of the Phaedrus, this is at 
least the necessary condition of true rhetoric (259e, 260d), which Socrates 
identifies with philosophy (261a).  Socrates’ further specification, that the 
rhetorical art in its entirety is a way of directing the soul by means of speech 
to do the right thing on both public and private occasions (261a), matches 
the stated purpose of the boy’s disguised admirer:  to help the boy decide, 
on the basis of the truth about eros and by means of the speech that is being 
delivered, ‘what benefit or harm is likely to come from the lover or the non-
lover to the youth who grants them his favours’ (238e).  In the light of 
these remarks, one may be tempted to infer that the concealed lover is, or 
aspires to be, a philosopher in the sense indicated above.  In any case,  he 
does attribute to philosophy the greatest value, since he claims that the 
greatest harm caused by the pleasure-seeking lover will be that he will pre-
vent his beloved from engaging in philosophy and improving his soul (cf. 
239b, 241c).  Third, the definition of eros that he gives is, clearly, of philo-
sophical ilk:  eros is a compelling desire to take pleasure in beauty (238c), 
only enhanced by the desire for beautiful people or things.  Regardless of 
the exact referent of beauty in this context, the definition implies that eros 
is a desire for something universal, distinct from cognate desires for parti-
culars which also have the property instantiated in the universal. 
The concealed lover himself illustrates to some extent a tendency to 
move away from particulars and towards the universal.  From a theoretical 
point of view, as indicated, he deploys a kind of reasoning which involves 
abstract concepts such as knowledge, agreement, deliberation, desire, and 
love; and he defends psychological claims that are supposed to hold univer-
sally for man, not only for some individual man.  At a psychological and 
moral level, the concealed lover is of course an individual, and the erotic 
relation that he is seeking is a relation between individuals.  But it seems to 
me that, unlike Lysias’ non-lover, the concealed lover does not tie his indi-
 
28. It is not clear whether these belong to one genus or rather to two different genera. 
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viduality to matters of the body and does not treat the youth as an object of 
pleasure that is as good as many others, but rather the opposite holds true.  
For he does not try to manipulate the boy, but guides him to think for 
himself.  He does not promise, implicitly or explicitly,29 to the youth mate-
rial and social advantages, but instead he stresses the importance of educa-
tion and the care of the soul.  Not once does he refer to his own needs or to 
his expectation that the boy will meet them.  True, he is sensitive to the 
boy’s great beauty (μάλα καλός:  237b).  But his definition of eros implies 
that he is in a position to view his desire for the beautiful boy in the right 
manner, namely as auxiliary to a far more powerful and fundamental desire 
for beauty.  In sum, according to the concealed lover’s account, the eros of 
an older man for a young boy contains elements of both transcendence and 
individuality:  the older man experiences simultaneously both the desire for 
(or pleasure in) beauty and the cognate desire for (or pleasure in) the beaut-
iful youth.  However, the concealed lover does not explain in just what 
manner the latter kind of desire lends force to the former or assists in its 
fulfilment. 
We are now in a position to determine, at least in part, what kind of 
self-knowledge the concealed lover has.  It goes well beyond his awareness 
of the attraction that he feels for the boy and the manner in which he may 
gain the boy’s favours.  He knows about good decision-making and advises 
the lad accordingly.  He is well-versed in the method of ‘divisions and col-
lections’ and, generally, dialectical discourse.  He understands the incom-
parable value of philosophy and of the cultivation of the soul by means of 
philosophical education.  He speaks with authority about different kinds of 
desire and about the nature of love.  And since he offers a putative defini-
tion of erotic love, he can give a theoretical explanation of his desire for the 
youth and place it in a larger context.  Regarding the concept of rationality 
pertaining to the concealed lover, it seems incomparably broader and 
deeper than the pragmatic calculations of Lysias’ protagonist.  It comprises 
sound deliberation and theoretical reasoning according to the rules of dia-
lectic (237b ff.); concern for logical consistency and interpersonal agree-
ment (237b-c); a systematic contrast between irrational desire and rational 
opinion, one’s craving for pleasure and one’s judgement of what is best 
(237d-238a); but also the intimation that, although erotic desire aims at 
pleasure, nonetheless it is somehow related to the apprehension of an intel-
ligible entity, namely beauty.  Even the enumeration of the harmful conse-
quences of yielding to a lover has little to do with pragmatic means-ends 
 
29. The second part of the speech is apotreptic and hence there is no occasion for the 
concealed lover to speak directly about the emotions, advantages, etc. of non-lovers includ-
ing, apparently, himself. 
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reasoning.  On the contrary, it is effected according to psychological and 
pedagogical considerations and reflects the concealed lover’s care for the 
well-being of the youth. 
Even so, Socrates makes a deliberate and persistant effort to distance 
himself from the contents of that speech.  At the outset, he claims that he 
has heard a better speech somewhere, although he does not remember 
where and from whom (235c-d).  He disavows having any knowledge of 
the subject (235c), but presents himself as the passive recipient of the ideas 
contained in a speech that fills him ‘like an empty jar’ (235d).  Then he 
tries to wriggle himself out of the promise to deliver that speech by telling 
Phaedrus that he was only teasing him when he criticised Lysias, Phaedrus’ 
lover; in fact he had no intention to try to match Lysias’ speech with a 
better one (236b).  Next, he describes himself as an amateur who is being 
asked to improvise on the same topics as an expert (236d).  And before he 
complies with Phaedrus’ request, he announces that he will cover his head 
while he will be speaking in order to avoid feeling shame (237a).  At the 
very beginning of the speech he appeals to the Muses to ‘take up [his] 
burden’30 and grant their aid in the tale (237a).  Towards the middle of his 
performance, he interrupts in order to confess to Phaedrus that he is proba-
bly possessed by some divine force, which he identifies as the Nymphs’ 
frenzy’ (238c-d).  Finally, when he realises that he has offended Eros, a god, 
he informs his putative addressee31 that the speech was by Phaedrus, son of 
Pythocles, not by himself (244a). 
Socrates specifies that his unintentional insult to the god of Love lies in 
the fact that he has endorsed in his counterspeech the fundamental conces-
sion of the speech of Lysias, namely that eros implies a kind of madness and 
that every kind of madness is bad (cf. 235e-236a).  In the palinode, how-
ever, he will overturn that assumption in the most spectacular manner. 
II  
The palinode is a recantation that Socrates offers in earnest to the god 
of Love to purify himself from his earlier hybris and beg for his forgiveness 
and his blessings (243a, 257a-b).  And although he ostensibly disowns this 
speech too by attributing it to Stesichorus (244a),32 in fact he makes clear 
 
30. This is a quotation from an unknown source. 
31. The ‘beautiful boy’ whom he addresses in the palinode is probably the same as the 
addressee of Lysias’ non-lover as well as of the concealed lover in Socrates’ first speech. 
32. Socrates specifies that Stesichorus is the son of Euphemus from Himera, literally the 
Land of Desire (see Nehamas and Woodruff 1995, 27 n. 56).  According to Socrates, Stesi-
chorus delivered a formal recantation for an act of hybris that he had committed, after he 
had been punished for that hybris by the gods. 
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that he assumes full responsibility for its contents.  For he says that he will 
give the same kind of speech as Stesichorus, i.e., a formal recantation, but 
unlike Stesichorus he will recant before he gets punished for his offense 
(243b).  He announces that he will deliver the speech with his head unco-
vered and no sense of shame (243b).  And, in any case, he must endorse the 
speech completely, because otherwise he cannot hope for Love’s forgiveness 
and favour (257a-b). 
At the outset, I should like to address the controversial issue whether 
the myth that constitutes the core of the speech should be taken seriously 
as a philosophical text.  For several interpreters doubt or deny that it 
should on various grounds.  For example, one scholar assesses it as an 
example of the true rhetoric described later in the dialogue and ascribes to 
it positive value, but then retracts some of that value by suggesting that the 
speech is vulnerable to Socrates’ later criticism against written texts.33  
Others maintain that myths may not be appropriate means of teaching34 or 
that they do not constitute a philosophical way of defending a position as 
true.  Yet others point out that the palinode and especially the myth 
contain ideas and theories found in Plato’s earlier works but not in the later 
group of dialogues to which the Phaedrus belongs:  paradigmatism,35 recol-
lection, separatism,36 and the tripartite soul are all doctrines that Plato has 
developed in his middle dialogues but that he transforms or abandons 
completely in his later works.37  They conclude that ‘the truth Plato accepts 
does not consist of the philosophical theories the speech contains.  What if 
Plato simply wants to communicate instead the idea that philosophy is the 
most important part of life?’38  On the other hand, there are also many 
interpreters who take seriously the philosophy contained in the myth of 
the Great Speech.  For instance, one thesis advanced is that the Great 
Speech including of course the myth is also, essentially, a philosophical text 
 
33. See Rowe 1986 and 1989.  Rowe’s position is more nuanced, however, than it might 
appear at first sight.  For he argues that the palinode plays an essentially dynamic role in the 
sense that the reader’s perspective on the value and seriousness of its contents changes as the 
conversation develops. 
34. See Smith 1986. 
35. I.e. the idea that the Form is the perfect example of the feature for which it stands:  
Beauty is beautiful and, in fact, it is the most beautiful thing there is – much more beautiful 
than the beautiful boy whose sight causes his lover to recollect Beauty. 
36. Namely, the thesis that Forms are separate both from each other and from their 
instances. 
37. See Nehamas & Woodruff 1995,  xlii-xliv. 
38. Ibid.  xliv. 
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which enjoys the putative status of a spoken discourse.39  A different ap-
proach argues for the philosophical credibility of the myth on the basis of 
the similarities that it has with the doctrines of Plato’s later dialogues and 
also, importantly, its agreement with the argument for the immortality of 
the soul which immediately precedes it.40  Since I side with this second 
group of interpreters, and since I intend to treat the myth as philosophy 
rather than rhetoric or literature, I ought to give my own reasons for doing 
so. 
First of all, it is important to note that the tendency to question the 
philosophical seriousness of the palinode marks modern approaches only.  
On the contrary, ancient Platonists treat the myth as serious philosophy 
and devote much attention to its details.41  The central positions of the 
myth are also found in later dialogues and especially in the Laws, where 
they are stated in the form of philosophical doctrines or arguments.42  Also, 
assuming as many of us do that the palinode is the heart of the Phaedrus, it 
seems implausible to think that Socrates would retract from its philo-
sophical value in the second part of the dialogue.  The opposite ought to be 
expected:  that the sections of the dialogue concerning rhetoric and writing 
would lend support to the philosophical credibility of the Great Speech.  
Besides, we should recall that the Great Speech consists of argument as well 
as myth.  While the argument to the effect that the soul is necessarily 
always in motion and therefore is immortal is an unusually dense and 
rigorous proof,43 Socrates indicates that myth is more appropriate for the 
task at hand.  For, he says, while it would be very difficult and lengthy to 
give a proper account of ‘what the soul actually is’ and such an account may 
be even impossible for a human being (246a), it is easier and shorter to say 
‘what the soul is like’; this last goal is what the myth aims to achieve (246a).  
 
39. See Heath 1989a.  Especially, Heath argues that the palinode is philosophical in so 
far as it represents an attempt by Socrates to teach Phaedrus something ‘about what is just, 
fine, and good, an attempt to sow seeds in his soul that will bear philosophical fruit’ (ibid. 
159; cf. Phaedr. 276e-277a).  Hence it is a different kind of logos from those spoken ‘in the 
manner of rhapsodes’ (277e), which aim to entertain and persuade without teaching, and 
which ‘are recited in public without questioning and explanation’ (277e). 
40. Bett 1986, 21. 
41. See Anonymous. In Plat. Tht. 48.2-4 (= Phaedr. 249e4-5), edited by Bastianini & 
Sedley 1995; also Alcinous, Didaskalikos, especially 153. 5-6, 26; 155. 26; 157, 27-36; 165, 
4-5.  For Hermeias, see the relevant parts of the text and commentary in Couvreur 1971; 
Bernard 1997.  For Iamblichus, see Dillon 1973, ad loc., frs. 6-7.  For Proclus as well as 
Iamblichus, see two papers discussing relevant passages: van den Berg 1997; Sheppard 2000.  
On the relation between human souls and the World Soul see also Plotinus, Ennead IV.3 
and 4 and Hermeias, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ad Phaedr. 246b, p. 130-131 Couvreur. 
42. See Bett 1986. 
43. See Bett 1986. 
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Furthermore, a myth may well be the best device available for exploring a 
subject which lies beyond the realm of ordinary reason and experience, 
namely the nature of the soul;44  the same holds for explaining eros in terms 
of an extra-rational condition, a kind of madness (cf. 243a-245c).  Turning 
to doctrinal matters, on the one hand, it is arguable that the palinode 
revives some views that may have been criticised in earlier dialogues or had 
disappeared long before.  On the other hand, in some cases it is not certain 
that Plato has abandoned the relevant views on the basis of previous criti-
cism, whereas in other cases the reemergence of certain positions in the 
Great Speech can plausibly be explained by reference to the dramatic and 
philosophical context.  For instance, while it is true that paradigmatism is 
criticised in the Parmenides, there is no decisive evidence that the Parme-
nides predates the Phaedrus.  And in any case, assuming that the Timaeus 
was completed after the Parmenides, it constitutes strong evidence that 
paradigmatism was not abandoned on the basis of the criticisms in the Par-
menides which, as Parmenides himself says, can be answered.  Besides, in the 
dramatic context of the palinode, paradigmatism seems to be a fairly 
intuitive way in which Socrates explains to Phaedrus how love for a beauti-
ful youth can lead towards Beauty, and the same consideration applies to 
recollection.45  As for separatism, i.e., the view that each Form is an inde-
pendent object complete in itself and intelligible as a whole, it is difficult to 
ascertain whether it is either asserted or denied in dialogues earlier than the 
Phaedrus.  In any case, the central claim of separatism appears perfectly 
suitable in order to describe the kinds of objects that the souls standing at 
the rim of heaven contemplate, whereas there is no occasion in the myth to 
talk about the relations between Forms – a topic investigated in other 
dialogues of the group to which the Phaedrus belongs.  On another matter 
regarding the structure of the soul, it is true that the tripartite soul of the 
palinode does not exactly match the three parts of the soul in the Republic46 
or elsewhere.  Importantly, there does not seem to be a one-to-one corres-
pondence between the two lower parts of the soul in the Republic and the 
two winged horses in the Phaedrus and one difference is that in the latter 
dialogue the roles of the two horses remain underdetermined.  On the 
 
44. Cf. Resp. 377a, where it is mentioned that a myth may be false if considered as a 
whole, but nonetheless may lead towards truth.  On the philosophical value of myths, see 
Partenie 2004:  xviii-xix.  See also Partenie 2009.  The essays of that collection exhibit 
different ways in which myth and philosophy are essentially interconnected in various 
Platonic dialogues.  A valuable comprehensible treatment of the subject is Brisson 1982.  A 
short assessment of Plato’s use of myth is Murray 1999.  
45. As Nehamas & Woodruff 1995 remark (xliv), recollection never emerges again in 
Plato’s later dialogues. 
46. See, most recently, Obdrzalek 2012.  
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other hand, there does not seem to be any real conflict between the Republic 
and the Phaedrus on this point.  Moreover, as will become clear, the meta-
phorical imagery of the myth suits well its philosophical purpose.  In parti-
cular, the partially defined roles of the horses and especially of the white 
horse successfully convey the idea that in erotic love impulse cannot be 
easily distinguished from appetite.47 
Of course, I do not wish to deny that the myth is a powerful piece of 
rhetoric as well as of philosophy.48  In fact, the entire palinode pursues both 
persuasion and truth, and Socrates takes pains to emphasise both these 
aspects.  On the one hand, he asserts that he is by divine gift an expert at 
love (257a), thus implying that he has the relevant kind of knowledge to be 
able to give a truthful or approximately truthful account of eros.  On the 
other hand, he has a rhetorical goal, namely to convince Phaedrus to direct 
himself towards living a life devoted to eros and philosophy (257b).  And 
also he is confident that his speech will ‘convince the wise if not the clever’ 
that eros is a gift sent by the gods (245b-c).  As we learn from the second 
part of the Phaedrus, the only kind of rhetoric able to persuade the wise is 
truthful rhetoric, i.e., philosophical rhetoric (cf. 261a); and only the expert 
orator knows how to convey truth convincingly, by choosing the right sort 
of speech for the right sort of audience on a given issue (271d).  Socrates 
claims to know the truth about eros and at the same time follows the 
rhetorical convention of telling his audience that he will speak the truth.  
And although he disavows expertise in both rhetoric and dialectic (cf. 
266b-c), nonetheless he does call himself a lover of speeches (228b) and ‘a 
lover of “divisions and collections’’’ (266b) and his performance in the 
Great Speech confirms that he is familiar with both.  Here is not the place 
to decide whether Socrates is the only true rhetor or whether he identifies 
 
47. I.e., it is debatable whether the white horse corresponds exactly to the spirited part 
and the black horse to the appetitive part.  For example, the white horse does not seem to 
act in alliance with the charioteer in order to tame the black horse – hence the white horse 
does not perform in an obvious manner the function of thymos in the Republic.  Moreover, 
the black horse appears to be the element mainly responsible for the amorous impulse of the 
soul towards the beautiful youth and also for forcing the lover to express his sentiments to 
the beloved and eventually cause reciprocal eros.  But that kind of impetuosity seems closer 
to the spirit than to the appetite, although of course the black horse is also associated with 
bodily appetites and in particular sexual desire.  I am grateful to Michel Narcy for his re-
marks on this topic. 
48. On the main functions of Platonic myths, see Partenie 2004,  xvii-xix. 
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philosophy and rhetoric.  All we need to retain is that the Great Speech 
both instructs and captures, at least for a time, Phaedrus’ soul.49  
On my account the palinode has two principal aims:  to redress what 
Socrates said in his previous speech by producing a eulogy of eros; and to 
solve Socrates’ puzzle.  These two aims are related:  understanding the 
nature of eros requires understanding the nature of man and every man.  In 
other words, the enquiry into eros is an enquiry into the nature of the self 
and in particular the human self.  From the start, Socrates rejects the as-
sumption on which his previous speech was based, namely that eros is mad-
ness and madness is bad.  On the contrary, he contends, there are sacred 
and beneficial sorts of madness (243a) and erotic love is ‘such a sort of 
madness given by the gods for our greatest good fortune’ (245b).   
I shall now argue for my first contention, namely that the palinode 
identifies the self with the soul.  Although the thesis that the real self is the 
soul is, by the date of composition of the Phaedrus, standard Socratic or 
Platonic doctrine, nonetheless it is not as explicitly stated in the palinode as 
it is stated, for instance, in the Apology, the Crito, the Phaedo, and the 
Alcibiades.  Therefore I should like to defend it with regard to the Great 
Speech:  the position that the soul is the self, I shall suggest, underlies So-
crates’ entire account in the palinode so that ‘the truth about the nature of 
the soul, divine or human’ (245c) is really the truth or an approximation of 
the truth about the nature of the self, human or divine.  In the first place, 
that thesis gains support from the argument for the immortality of the soul 
and especially from the claim that the body appears to move simply because 
it contains a self-mover, the soul (245c-245e); it follows that the body is 
merely an instrument for psychic functions, whereas the soul is the only 
thing alive in us.  Moreover, the simile of the team of winged horses and 
their charioteer is developed in such manner as to drive a sharp wedge be-
tween animate and inanimate substances (246b), reify the body (246c), and 
explain how the body of empirical living things constitutes a condition of 
their mortality (246c-d).  Since the body is the thing that dies while the 
soul is the immortal surviver of that union, it is reasonable to infer that self-
hood and personal identity reside in the soul, not in the body.  The same 
inference is strongly suggested by the contention that the soul consists of 
higher and lower elements, of which the former (the charioteer of the 
simile) rules the latter;50 one of the lower elements (the black horse of the 
 
49. When the palinode ends, Phaedrus joins Socrates in his prayer that god grant him a 
life of eros and philosophy, and he also says that he has admired Socrates’ speech from its 
very beginning (257c). 
50. Whether or not the rational part actually has the desire to rule is a matter of 
controversy.  For example, see Cooper 1999; Ferrari 2007.  A different approach is sug-
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simile which roughly corresponds to the appetitive part) pertains speci-
fically to the body and its needs (cf. 246d-e); therefore, by ruling the black 
horse, the higher element of the soul not only animates but also rules the 
body.  However, it must be noted that although selfhood pertains pecu-
liarly to the ruling element corresponding to reason, nonetheless the two 
lower parts of the soul, the horses of the simile, are not irrelevant to the self.  
At the very least, they form a ‘natural union’ together with their driver (cf. 
ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει:  246a).  And while they (and especially the black horse) 
are very much  associated with the body (μάλιστα τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα:  246d-
e), first, they remain distinct from it and, second, they have a divine ele-
ment, the wings, which enables the driver to lift up the chariot and to nou-
rish the entire soul by gazing at the realities beyond (246e).   
Moreover, Socrates identifies the soul with the self in the second half of 
the speech, when he refers in the first person plural to the philosophers’ 
souls in their discarnate state,51 as they follow the train of Zeus and see the 
Forms (250b-c).  It is worth quoting the passage in full. 
Justice and Temperance and the other objects which are precious to souls 
do not shine through their images here on earth; only a few people, ap-
proaching the images through the murky senses, are able to contemplate, 
though with difficulty, the form of what they imitate.  But Beauty was 
radiant to see at the time when the souls, in the company of the blissful 
chorus – we (ἡμεῖς) following in the train of Zeus while others following in 
the train of some other gods – saw the blessed sight and vision and were 
initiated into the mystery that is rightly called the most blessed of all.  This 
we celebrated being ourselves (αὐτοί) wholly perfect and untouched by 
those evils that awaited us (ἡμᾶς) in the time to come, being initiated into 
and gazing at sacred apparitions which were perfect, and simple, and un-
shakeable, and blissful, in pure light, pure ourselves and not buried (καθαροὶ 
ὄντες καὶ ἀσήμαντοι) in this thing that we are carrying around now and we 
call a body, imprisoned in it like an oyster in its shell (250b-c). 
According to this passage, ‘we’ philosophers are the philosophical souls, 
who see Beauty and the other Forms as they follow the god of their choice 
 
gested, most recently, by Obdrzalek 2012, who engages to some extent with the two works 
previously mentioned. 
51. Nehamas & Woodruff 1995 (39 n. 93) point out that Socrates’ confident claim ‘we 
(scil. the philosophers) were with Zeus’ is uncharacteristic of Socrates and especially of his 
portrait in the Phaedrus and conclude that we should be cautious or even reluctant to attri-
bute directly to him the views that he is made to express in the speech.  Rather, in their opi-
nion, Socrates is projecting here an image that Phaedrus may find appealing.  For my own 
part, I agree that the image has considerable rhetorical force but, as I indicated above, I do 
not think it follows that Socrates may not subscribe to the philosophical views expressed in 
the palinode. 
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in heaven, and who must carry about their human bodies so long as they 
live on this earth. 
I turn now to my next contention, in virtue of which I join the camp of 
the particularists:  the souls are individuals, and they retain their meta-
physical individuality both on earth and in the heavens.  If this contention 
is correct, the palinode differs in that respect from the Alcibiades and 
perhaps also the Charmides52 for, unlike those dialogues, it suggests neither 
that the individual self eventually becomes one with universals such as wis-
dom and god (cf. Alc.  133c) nor that the individual self is identical with 
wisdom understood in some entirely objective manner (Charm. 166c ff.).53  
To my knowledge, the contention that the souls retain their individuality 
on both earth and heaven has not been debated in the literature.54  There-
fore, first, I should adduce some textual evidence to support it. 
It is reasonably clear, it seems to me, that Socrates intends everything he 
says about the soul to apply to every individual soul qua soul.  And some-
thing similar holds for the characteristics that the myth ascribes to the ele-
ven choruses of souls following the eleven gods as they patrol the heavens:  
the features differentiating each chorus apply to each and every soul in that 
chorus.  One possible explanation can be that Socrates uses ‘soul’ (ψυχή) to 
indicate, collectively, a single kind of thing, of which individual souls (or 
individual souls of a certain chorus) consist, so that everything that holds 
true of the soul will also hold true of individual souls.55  In the proof of the 
soul’s immortality, the ambiguity between ‘all soul’ and ‘every soul’ (cf. 
ψυχή πᾶσα:  245c), and also between ‘all the soul’ and ‘every soul’ (πᾶσα ἡ 
ψυχή or ψυχή πᾶσα:  245b)56 seems to me to confirm this reading:  since the 
soul is the kind of thing that always and necessarily moves itself and hence 
is essentially immortal, every individual soul will have these characteristics 
(245c-e);57 and since the soul is the kind of thing that cares for everything 
soulless while patrolling the heavens, individual souls will be engaged in just 
 
52. See Tsouna 1997. 
53. See also below, 227-229. 
54. The idea that the soul is individuated from the start is noted (but not defended) by 
Griswold 1986, 100-101.  On the other hand, Fossheim 2010 argues for the presence and 
importance of non-individuality of soul in the Phaedrus mainly on two counts:  the soul is a 
non-individuated force, a basic principle of the cosmos; moreover, the view of the soul ad-
vanced by the Phaedrus belongs to a broader social and political context, in which Plato 
stresses unity and collectivity at the expense of individuality. 
55. See Bett 1986, 12-13. 
56. The mss. differ, but pace Bett 1986 (14 and n. 23), the presence or absence of the 
definite article does not seem to make a difference concerning the denotation of the phrase. 
57. On the concept of self-mover, see the classic study of Furley 1980.  See also Demos 
1968.  
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that activity (246b).58  The fact that Socrates has in mind both the soul col-
lectively and souls as individuals becomes more evident as the myth deve-
lops.  Every soul has the form (cf. ἰδέας:  246a) of a charioteer yoked to a 
team of winged horses, which are thoroughly good in divine souls but 
mixed in the souls of other creatures (246b).  Socrates describes the soul’s 
supra-celestial movement and supervisory activity by using the singular 
with or without the definite article (cf. 245b), and he also uses the singular 
with the definite article to refer to the soul that has shed its wings and falls 
earthwards until it hits upon a solid body (ἡ δέ:  246c).  Also, he marks 
individuality by using the plural to refer to ‘both the horses and the 
charioteers of the gods’ and to those ‘of other creatures’ (246a-b).  Surely, 
the fall of  the soul and its insertion into a body makes best sense if we take 
‘the soul’ (ἡ δέ:  246c) to be an individual:  a particular soul loses its plu-
mage, heads downwards, enters a particular body which appears to move 
because of the soul’s power, and this soul together with this body constitute 
a whole (ξύμπαν:  246c), namely a mortal animal.  In sum, to speak of the 
experiences and deeds of the soul there is need to focus on the soul as an 
individual.  And since the soul is the self, the myth narrates the travels and 
travails of the self considered individually more than in a collective manner. 
Metaphysical individuality is highlighted by other features of the myth 
as well.  The gods, who are driving their winged chariots each leading his or 
her own procession, are each identical with himself or herself, i.e., with his 
or her own soul.59  They bear names, are distinct from each other, and each 
has his or her own peculiar characteristics:  Zeus has dignity and nobility 
(252c-e), Ares can turn murderous (252c), Hera is of a kingly nature 
(253b), and so on.  As mentioned, the characteristics of each god are also 
shared by the souls who have chosen to follow him or her in the heavens, 
and especially by those who attend closely the god of their choice, making 
themselves most godlike (248a).  The souls are further individuated by 
reference to their experiences during the supra-celestial procession.  While 
the god’s chariots climb easily to the high tier of heaven because of the 
excellent condition of their teams, the other chariots may or may not make 
it to the high rim on which the gods stand to be carried around by the 
circular motion of the rim and gaze at the Forms (247b-c).  The extent to 
which each of these chariots is carried around and able to see Forms varies 
from one chariot to another, from one soul to another, and it depends on 
 
58. Although Bett’s reading of this passage differs in places from mine (cf. Bett 1986, 14 
and n. 23), nonetheless we are in agreement that ψυχή πᾶσα does not refer to the World-
Soul.  I would add that the same conclusion can be drawn even if we accept the alternative 
ms. reading πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή. 
59. The immortal gods do not have a body:  246d. 
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the soul’s tendencies, the behaviour of the horses (the soul’s lower ele-
ments) , and the ability of the driver (who, as mentioned, represents rea-
son) (248a-b).  The degree to which each soul contemplates the Forms also 
depends on accidental factors, which may burden the soul to the point of 
bringing it from the heaven down to earth (248c).  So, while some souls fly 
high enough for the charioteer to keep his head raised and take a look at 
the realities beyond the heaven (248a), others see Forms only intermit-
tently (248a), and many do not see Forms at all (248a-b).  This last group 
of souls can be differentiated further in accordance with the opinions that 
each of these souls holds, mistaking them for knowledge (248b).  Thus, 
unlike the gods all of whom lead a similar kind of life in heaven, each of the 
other souls has its own supra-celestial history, which is determined by a set 
of factors relevant only to that soul.  These factors also influence the lives 
that each soul lives on earth during the reincarnation cycle.  At least in the 
first incarnation (cf. 248d), the kind of person into which the soul will 
enter is chosen according to how much of the Forms the soul has seen 
(248d-e).  In other words, an individual soul’s supra-celestial history deter-
mines the starting point of its first earthly life.  Moreover, a soul’s indivi-
dual choices so long as it is on earth determine both the type of beings that 
the soul will join and the duration of its incarnate existence (248e-249c). 
However, the universalists could still press their case.  For they could 
insist that, even if the soul can be individuated in the above respects, none-
theless it becomes non-individual and impersonal in the very act of contem-
plating the Forms; for contemplation, they could maintain, involves the 
assimilation of the knowing soul to its object and hence the abolition of 
what we commonly consider the self.  To meet that objection I wish now to 
argue that, in fact, individuality constitutes a necessary presupposition for 
both the contemplation of the Forms in the heavens and their recollection 
by embodied souls on earth.  Recall that the avowed purpose of the pali-
node is to praise eros and that Socrates has defined eros as a most beneficial 
kind of madness that the soul of an older man experiences when it sees a 
particular instance of Beauty, a beautiful boy, and begins to recollect 
Beauty itself.  Assuming that the lover’s soul has looked upon Beauty 
recently and got a clear vision of it, his recollection of the Form is so power-
ful that he is overcome and literally loses his mind to Beauty forgetting 
everything else in his earthly life and pursuing the boy who reminds him of 
that Form.  According to this picture, the capacity of an incarnate soul to 
fall in love is causally determined by the experiences of that soul in heaven:  
the more and the better it has gazed at Beauty and the other Realities, the 
easier it can bring them back to memory.  And the converse, which holds 
for most men:  their souls have not seen much of the Forms in their dis-
carnate state and therefore are unable to see the Form of Beauty in a 
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particular, so they are unable to truly fall in love.60  The metaphor of the 
regrowth of the wings conveys not only the universal elements of that 
extraordinary experience but also its highly individual character.  On the 
one hand, all true lovers have a common experience in so far as they see the 
Form of Beauty in the particular object of their eros (cf. 249c);61 feel fear 
and reverence at that sight (251a); have psycho-physical symptoms, such as 
sweating and fever, because of the stream of particles that flow from the 
beauty of the beloved and enter the lover’s eyes (251b); feel a kind of 
seething and throbbing in their soul (251b); and suffer excruciating pain 
when their beloved leaves their sight, but pleasure when they see or 
remember his beauty (251d).  On the other hand, eros also remains a 
powerful desire of one individual for another.  Unlike Lysias’ non-lover 
who gives us reason to believe that he would readily exchange one boy for 
another,62 the philosophical lover of the palinode treats his beloved as both 
a divinity and a particular human being peculiarly suitable to the lover’s 
own preferences and tendencies.  ‘Everyone chooses his love after his own 
fashion from the ranks of those who are beautiful and then treats the boy 
like his very own god, building him up and adorning him as an image to 
honour and worship’ (252d-e).  Moreover, Socrates’ panegyric account of 
the eros obtaining between philosophers (256a-b) and also between lovers 
of honour (256b-d) points to the personal ties betwen the members of 
these couples and to their abiding companionship. 
To take stock:  what I called the metaphysical individuality of each and 
every soul, and especially each and every human soul, consists in the follow-
ing features.  Every soul is numerically distinct, the same as itself and dif-
ferent from every other soul.  It is marked by its own tendencies and makes 
its own choices.  It has its own history and its own experiences.  It deter-
mines its own future and in particular the nature and duration of the rein-
carnation cycle.  It has the power of recollection, and it can be transported 
by love.  In virtue of these last two features, I shall now maintain, it has also 
the power to transcend itself.63  To understand how this is possible, we 
 
60. See Scott 1999.  Compare, for instance, the earlier study of Irwin 1974. 
61. This is the main reason why, according to Vlastos, Platonic eros is essentially objec-
tive and impersonal and misses something important about that kind of human attachment:  
Vlastos 1981.  A good summary of the leading critical responses to Vlastos is found in 
Obdrzalek 2012 n. 32.  They include Ferrari 1992;  Kosman 1976;  Griswold 1986, 127 ff.; 
Nussbaum 1986, passim.  On this subject, see also Santas 1982; Gould 1963. 
62. See also Phaedr. 256e, which draws a final contrast between the narrow-minded 
familiarity of the non-lover and the blessings of genuine love.  
63. However, the myth may invite the objection that the factors mentioned above 
presuppose rather than determine the individuality of the soul.  If one assumes that numerical 
identity serves as the principle of individuation, one would have to face the problem of 
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need to turn briefly to another kind of individuality pertaining to human 
souls, namely what I have labelled empirical individuality. 
According to the myth, empirical individuality has to do with the black 
horse of the simile and its interactions with both its white peer and the dri-
ver.64  The first thing to emphasise is that the two winged horses are com-
ponents of the soul and hence essential aspects of the self:  in the terms of 
Republic IV, not only reason but also spirit and appetite are parts of who we 
truly are.65  According to a standard (and, I believe, correct) interpretation 
of the picture, these elements create an inherent tension within every hu-
man soul:  while the rational element, hopefully aided by the spirit, strains 
the soul upwards towards contemplation, the appetitive element (the black 
horse of the metaphor), because of its very nature, forces the soul earth-
wards and into some body.  The peculiarly close association of the black 
horse with some individual body is conveyed by the description of its pro-
perties.  Unlike the white horse which is beautiful and good (καλὸς τε καὶ 
ἀγαθός:  246b) and of noble descent, the black horse is ugly and bad and of 
poor stock;66 hence it is responsible for the mixed character of human 
teams (cf. μέμεικται)67 as well as the inevitably painful and difficult task of 
driving the chariot of a human soul (246b).  Moreover, we are told that the 
black horse is heavy and tends towards the earth on account of its weight 
(ῥέπων τε καὶ βαρύνων:  247b).  The missing link here is supplied by the 
Phaedo, which explicitly connects heaviness with bodies:  souls who have 
lived too close to the body and have served its desires are weighed down by 
 
explaining numerical identity without any connection to matter.  In my view, the myth 
leaves open this problem, which finds one solution in Plotinus’ doctrine of individual forms:  
in outline, Socrates’ soul is different from Callias’ in the sense that Socrates’ soul is an ideal 
entity logically different from the soul of Callias.  As mentioned (n. 11), another way of 
individuating the soul could be by reference to its causal powers. 
64. Since the psychology suggested by that picture has received much attention in the 
literature, I shall concentrate only on aspects of the simile directly relevant to my argument.   
65. Concerning the differences as well as the similarities between the accounts of the 
tripartite soul in the Republic and the Phaedrus see, most recently, Obdrzalek 2012, who 
also offers a brief survey of the relevant literature. 
66. Moreover, the white horse stands on the right and nobler side, is upright, has good 
limbs and joints, a high neck, a regal nose, dark eyes, and it is a lover of honour, possesses 
modesty and self-control and also is a lover of true glory and is guided by words of command 
(253d).  On the contrary, the black horse stands on the left side, is crooked, has bad legs and 
joints, a short and thick neck, a flat nose, dark colour, grey and bloodshot eyes, is full of 
insolence and pride, deaf and shaggy around the ears, obedient not to words but to the whip 
and that even barely (253e).  These features are important for the psychological account of 
the boy’s capture (253c-256e). 
67. It is not clear whether τῶν ἄλλων (246b) refers only to humans or to other creatures 
as well.  In any case, I shall be concerned only with human souls. 
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the corporeal element, which is ‘burdensome, heavy (βαρύ), earthly, and 
visible’ (81c); and they are bound to wander in the physical region until 
they are reincarnated again to become part of some inferior man (81b-d).  
The upshot is that appetite makes it difficult to drive the soul upwards 
towards the Forms.  For appetite can find its full expression and fulfillment 
only if the soul lives the life of the body and caters to its needs.   
Empirical individuality is foreshadowed in the allegorical narrative of 
the struggle of the souls to gaze upon the Forms.  One soul tries to follow 
closely the god of its choice and manages to have a view of these Realities 
despite the fact that the horses68 cause disturbance (θορυβουμένη:  248a).  
Another sees the Forms only partially and only intermittently, because its 
horses are unruly (βιαζομένων:  248a).69  But many souls do not manage to 
see the Forms at all.  They are carried round beneath the surface of heaven, 
jostling, falling upon one another and trying to get ahead of one another 
amidst great noise, rivalry, and toil; many become lame and many break 
their wings (248a-b).  The intense physicality of the scene points to the 
kind of life that such souls will lead when they enter human bodies – a life 
full of confusion, competition, and pain.  Although they are still in heaven, 
their lower element has got its way;70 their individuality is already very 
much determined by reference to the body.71  However, there is no doubt 
that the association of the black horse with the body becomes particularly 
powerful after the first incarnation takes place.  And that situation acquires 
additional poignancy when human beings fall into the throes of eros.  Here 
too the physicality of the language is unmistakeable.  While the noble lover 
 
68. Cf. the two occurrences of the genitive plural τῶν ἵππων in 248a.  
69. Concerning human souls, since the white horse is supposed to be thoroughly good 
and obedient to the charioteer (cf. 253d-254a), the disturbance and unruliness should be 
attributed to the black horse alone or, alternatively, should be taken to point out that the 
two horses pull in opposite directions and thus cause the soul to lose its balance and control.  
Contrast the divine teams, whose horses are well-matched (εὐήνια) and therefore the cha-
riots are balanced (cf. ἰσορρόπως) and move upwards easily (247b).  There is disagreement as 
to how to interpret the differences between divine and human teams.  On one view, these 
differences yield an irremediably pessimistic view of human nature (see, most recently, 
Obdrzalek 2012, especially 85-86, 97-99), whereas on another the conflict within human 
souls can be resolved and all three parts can function in harmony in order to live the 
philosophical life (e.g. Nussbaum 1986). 
70. I.e., it has brought the soul in such condition as to force it eventually to submit to 
the constraints of the body.  Ultimately, the reason is both psychological and 
epistemological:  the drivers have been incapable of disciplining their horses and lifting the 
chariot up to gaze upon Reality; therefore the teams under discussion are nourished by 
opinion, which they mistake for proper nourishment, i.e., truth (248b). 
71. In the spirit of the Phaedo, we might say that every one of them lives the life of the 
body even before entering some individual body on earth. 
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pursues the beautiful youth of his choice because he sees Beauty in him and 
that sight causes the wings of his soul to grow (cf. 251b-252b), the black 
horse in his soul forces him to approach the youth and ask for sexual 
favours (τῆς τῶν ἀφροδισίων χάριτος:  254a).  The black horse heeds neither 
‘the pricks nor the whip’, ‘it springs wildly forward’,  and ‘it causes all man-
ner of trouble to both his mate and the charioteer’ (254a).  Nor does it give 
up when the charioteer pulls back the reins violently and makes it bleed –
 not until it extracts the promise to get its own pleasures sometime later 
(254d).  Again, when time supposedly comes, it struggles and neighs and 
pulls and, getting near, ‘it lowers its head, raises his tail, takes the bit in his 
teeth and pulls shamelessly’ (254d-e).72  Even when it subdues itself even-
tually to the charioteer (254e), its capitulation is not definitive, for after 
the courtship is properly conducted and the boy eventually reciprocates, 
the black horse asks again for its dues (255e-256a).  Only the philosophers-
lovers are able to subordinate it entirely.  Even the lovers of honour (the 
second best kind of lovers) must yield somewhat to its urges (cf. 256a-e). 
What of the charioteer?  What of reason?  This question brings us back 
to our starting point:  the issue of transcendence and the debate between 
the universalists and the particularists.  The position that I wish to advo-
cate is this.  Reason must retain its individuality because it is yoked toge-
ther with the non-rational elements of the soul and hence cannot become 
entirely Form-like.  But it also must break, albeit temporarily, its own 
boundaries in order to seek its proper sustenance.  (Socrates alludes, I 
think, precisely to the relevant kind of transcendence when he poses the 
question whether there may not be something divine in us).  The degree to 
which each incarnate soul can transcend its own boundaries varies.  Mostly, 
it depends on the causal history of the soul before birth and, to a lesser 
extent, on the training of the lower elements.  To substantiate these claims 
and, especially, to clarify further that concept of transcendence I propose to 
revisit the myth of the palinode for one last time.   
At the outset, however, it is useful to supply some context for that 
concept by outlining the positions of two dialogues mentioned earlier, the 
Charmides and the Alcibiades, which have been taken to suggest in dif-
ferent ways that the highest achievement of the rational soul is to surpass 
one’s individual self and become connected somehow with elements of 
Reality.  The Charmides develops its central contention, that sophrosyne is a 
kind of knowledge, on the grounds of an apparently unwarranted shift 
from something individual and personal, the self, to something universal 
 
72. On the violence exercised by the ruling element to the black horse, see the insightful 
discussion of Obdrzalek 2012. 
 Voula Tsouna  
 
228 
and impersonal, knowledge.  Although Critias defines initially sophrosyne, 
temperance, as knowledge of oneself (ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ:  164d, 165b-e), he 
subsequently modifies that definition into knowledge or science of itself 
and the other sciences (cf. ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς:  166c).  One way of explaining 
the switch from knowledge of the self to knowledge of knowledge is to sug-
gest that, for Critias as well as for Socrates,73 the correct understanding of a 
virtue, sophrosyne, as well as of the self possessing that virtue, implies recon-
figuring these concepts in some objective manner:  sophrosyne is not a fea-
ture of some individual self, but rather a feature of the knowing faculty 
whose principal object is knowledge without qualification.74  The Alci-
biades argues in a more direct and explicit manner for the view that genuine 
self-knowledge entails some sort of transcendence.  Namely, Socrates first 
urges the young Alcibiades to take care of himself by endeavouring to know 
himself (128a), but then moves on to an analysis of the concept of the self 
as something entirely different from what we ordinarily take it to be (129b 
ff.).  To wit, he first identifies the self with the soul and demonstrates that 
knowledge of oneself is knowledge of the soul, not the body (128c-130c).  
Subsequently, he removes from the self every element that has to do with 
the individuality related to the body and maintains that the one-to-one 
dialectical encounters leading to self-knowledge are encounters between 
individual souls (129b-130c).  Next, in a passage whose meaning is much 
debated (130d), he distinguishes between the self itself (αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτὸ) and  
each individual self (αὐτὸ τὸ ἕκαστον) and indicates that, for present pur-
poses, it suffices to enquire in a provisional manner into the latter without 
exploring also the former.75  What follows confirms, in my view, that the 
self is considered individually, not in a universal manner.  For, using the 
famous image of the mirror (132d-133c), Socrates argues that the in-
dividual soul, aided by its dialectical interaction with another soul, gets to 
know itself by transcending the limits of its own individuality and contem-
plating Reality, i.e., wisdom and god (133c).  It remains open, I think, whe-
 
73. Socrates does not object in the least to the transformation of knowledge of oneself 
into knowledge of itself.  The fact that he remains silent about this matter can be inter-
preted as a dialectical move or, alternatively, as a tacit endorsement of the suggestion that, in 
the end, the self is simply knowledge of some sort. 
74. A variant of this interpretation is defended by Tsouna 1997.  However, it is still a 
matter of controversy how to understand the underdefined concept of  the knowledge of 
itself or  knowledge of knowledge. 
75. I defended this view in Tsouna 2001, 50-56.  Other commentators defend the 
opposite view, namely that Socrates proceeds to enquire into the nature of ‘the self itself’, 
although there is disagreement as to whether or not that expression involves some reference 
to Forms.  To my knowledge, the strongest defense of that intepretation is Brunschwig 
1996.  Useful remarks are also found in Annas 1985. 
 Individuality, universality, and the self  
 
229
ther the soul which effects this transcendence preserves its own individual-
ity or, alternatively, becomes one with divine wisdom. 
Returning to the myth of the Great Speech, we should recall the image 
of the ruling part of the human soul (cf. ἄρχων:  237d), the driver of the 
team, as he tries to make the winged structure ascend towards the rim of 
heaven while the inferior parts, the horses, pull in the opposite direction.  
There is no doubt that every team remains the same as itself whether it is 
moving upwards or downwards – in other words, it retains its own indivi-
dual identity.  The difference is that the climb upwards leads to a vision of 
true beings (ὄντως ὄντα:  247e), which also remain the same as themselves 
(cf. 247c-e), whereas the fall of the soul downwards leads to its incarcera-
tion in bodies which do not remain the same as themselves but are subject 
to change.  However, when the charioteer manages to pull the entire team 
up to the rim of heaven, the Forms are not seen by the entire individualised 
soul, but only by its driver:  only he can engage in contemplation, whereas 
the other two parts of the team cannot.76  As Socrates points out in non-
metaphorical terms, ‘the colourless, shapeless, and intangible essence, what 
really is what it is, with which all true knowledge is concerned,  is visible 
only to the mind (νῷ), the soul’s steersman’ (247c);  the mind alone is 
naturally capable of receiving77 the Forms and of being nourished (τρέφεται 
καὶ εὐπαθεῖ:  247d; cf. also 248b-c) by them.  And given that the Forms are 
in outer space, the driver must stretch his head up and out in order to have 
a view of them (ὑπερῆρε εἰς τὸν ἔξω τόπον:  248a).  From the standpoint of 
the individual, then, the contemplation of Forms can be said to involve a 
movement of the mind up and outwards:  up with regard to the earth and 
the concerns of the body; outwards perhaps with regard to accepted views 
that one tends to presuppose without (further) reflection. 
Additional features of the myth highlight other important aspects of 
the concept of transcendence.  First, transcendence presupposes the coope-
ration of all three parts of the soul.  Whether the lower elements are gently 
induced to align themselves to the goal of reason78 or violently compelled 
to do so,79 the fact is that reason cannot see Forms without them.  Consider 
the simile:  without the winged horses the soul’s ascent would not be at all 
possible, notwithstanding that the black horse naturally opposes that 
ascent.  Second, the gods alone can effect completely and perfectly the act 
of transcendence which consists in contemplating the Forms, whereas hu-
 
76. Most scholars hold this view, but there are a few exceptions as well:  see the dis-
cussion in Obdrzalek 2012 n. 17. 
77. Cf. δέξεσθαι:  247d.  Note, however, that certain editors bracket the entire phrase. 
78. So e.g. Nussbaum 1986. 
79. As contends e.g. Obdrzalek 2012, especially 97-98 and n. 37. 
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man souls can perform that act partially and imperfectly in various degrees 
depending on their individual condition.  As mentioned, even the human 
souls that are godlike cannot have a full and unimpeded view of the Forms 
but barely see them (cf. μόγις:  248a), while the other souls may not see 
them at all (248b).  Divine intelligence (θεοῦ διάνοια) feeds on mind and 
pure knowledge, whereas every other soul can take only what befits it (τὸ 
προσῆκον) (247d).80  The reason is not that god is all mind, whereas hu-
mans have extra-rational elements, but rather that the gods have two good 
horses, whereas humans have a good horse and a bad one.  Third, while the 
metaphor of nourishment might point to some sort of assimilation of the 
mind with the Forms, as I indicated, that possibility is precluded by several 
elements of the myth.  In fact, the myth preserves all the way through the 
distinction between the knower and the objects of knowledge, and that dis-
tinction holds for the souls of the gods as well as for the souls of men.  Each 
divine soul contemplates the Forms so long as the circular motion of the 
heaven allows it to do so, but after the soul has beheld these eternal entities 
and has feasted on them (ἑστιασθεῖσα) it passes down again within heaven 
and goes home (247e).  And even if the mind were assimilated to the 
Forms, the other parts of the soul would not be able to do so, for they do 
not feed on Forms.  The horses of the divine souls feed on nectar and 
ambrosia (247e), which are divine substances to be sure, but not Forms.  As 
for the horses of the human souls, the metaphor suggests, I believe, that 
there is a kind of nourishment appropriate for them too which, however, 
does not consist in Forms.81  It follows that the kind of transcendence envi-
saged by the Alcibiades, according to which the individual self eventually  
becomes absorbed into ‘wisdom and God’, is ruled out by the myth of the 
Phaedrus.  Fourth, the black horse is both an obstacle to and a precondition 
for transcendence, as is shown by the analysis of eros.  For, on the one hand, 
it frustrates the lover’s pursuit of Beauty in the beloved by clamouring for 
the pleasures of sex.82  On the other, it is rarely noticed in the literature that 
 
80. Cf. Hermeias’ plausible interpretation of the relevant claim:  p. 143, 7-11 Couvreur. 
81. Pace Obdrzalek 2012, especially n. 37.  On this point, see also Griswold 1986, 134-
136; Ferrari 1987, 194; Nussbaum 1986, 220; and Vlastos 1981, 39-40.  These references 
are also cited by Obdrzalek 2012 n. 37. 
82. Consider again the dynamic process by which the philosophical lover captures the 
beautiful boy that he loves.  At first, the lover’s reason beholds ‘the love-inspiring sight’ 
(ἐρωτικὸν ὄμμα:  253e) which fills the soul with desire, but nonetheless reason followed by 
the element corresponding to the white horse refrains from going close to the boy.  On the 
other hand, the element corresponding to the black horse becomes totally unruly and 
eventually forces the lover to approach the youth (ἰέναι πρὸς τὰ παιδικά:  254a) (254b).  As 
soon as the lover looks upon him, the youth’s beauty brings back the memory of Beauty and 
of Self-Control standing next to it (254254b).  The lover feels such fear and awe that he 
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the black horse is the force which compels the lover to approach the boy 
(254a) and enables him to begin his recollection of Beauty and the other 
Forms by bringing him in the close vicinity of the beautiful particular.83 
To conclude:  the palinode of the Phaedrus does not concentrate on the 
tension between the soul and the body in a general manner, as the Apology 
does; nor between objectivity and subjectivity, as the Charmides suggests; 
nor yet between an individual self and its universal or cosmic counterpart, 
as the Alcibiades implies.  Rather, I have maintained, the palinode deter-
mines the area of tension within one’s self, between the higher, ruling part 
and the lower parts constituting one’s immortal soul.  The explanation of 
eros shows how the struggle between these two elements is severe and why 
the stakes are so high.  If the worse element gets its way, transcendence is 
impossible:  the lovers will live the life of animals (cf. 250e) and then their 
souls will ‘pass into darkness and the journey under the earth’ (256d), 
taking the full ten thousand years to return to their disembodied state (cf. 
248e).  If, on the other hand, the better element controls the worse comple-
tely or almost, transcendence is possible and the better souls can have access 
to the Forms.  They lead godlike lives on earth and will be able to journey 
upwards to the heaven much sooner than other souls (256a-d).  As Socrates 
remarks, ‘neither human temperance nor divine madness can confer a grea-
ter good than this upon man’ (256b).   
Self-knowledge consists, precisely, in understanding fully that truth in 
the light of the account provided by the palinode.  Moreover, there emerges 
a new conception of rationality, which focuses on the transcendental acti-
vity of the mind, and also makes room for certain conditions that fall out-
side the realm of ordinary reason.   Eros is the most beneficial of these con-
ditions, a form of madness uniquely capable of aiding reason to recollect 
Beauty and the other Forms.  According to this enhanced conception of 
rationality, the truly rational person is one who is capable of losing one’s 
mind: becoming oblivious to earthly concerns and pursuing with single-
mindedness and devotion the vision of transcendental Realities.  As the 
palinode makes clear, the only persons who have that ability are the philo-
sophers, the lovers of beauty, or those with a musical and erotic nature 
 
pulls back violently overcoming the resistance of the lower elements.  As mentioned,  the 
process is repeated several times over until the persistence of the element corresponding to 
the black horse is entirely overcome and both the non-rational parts of the soul learn to 
obey reason.  What enables reason to achieve that feat is, precisely, its power to transcend 
individual beauty and perceive Beauty in the boy.  Moreover, when the beloved returns the 
lover’s eros and their souls both grow wings, another kind of transcendence becomes also 
possible, namely the final liberation of the soul from the body and the return of the soul to 
its discarnate state (cf. 256b-d).  
83. Obdrzalek 2012 makes a similar point but in a different philosophical context. 
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(248d).  Whatever the relation between these categories, it must be an inti-
mate one.  For Socrates’ final prayer to Eros is that Phaedrus ‘may simply 
devote his life to Love and philosophical discussions’ (257b). 
At long last a solution can be given, at least provisionally, to Socrates’ 
puzzle.  We are both beasts and men, both more complex and simpler, both 
human and divine.  Our humanity is eminently related to the activity and 
rule of the divine element in us, whereas our body pertains to our animal 
nature.84  The irreducible tension between these elements is the peculiar 
characteristic of the human condition.  From a philosophical point of view, 
it is difficult to assess just what this view implies for personal identity.  In 
the end, are we divided personalities in which (ideally) the rational element 
subdues by force our other psychic components, as the brutal treatment of 
the black horse might seem to suggest?  The answer depends in crucial 
ways, I think, on how much importance we ascribe to the myth’s suggestion 
that not only the charioteer but also the horses have their proper nourish-
ment, and also on how seriously we take not just the differences but also 
the similarities between divine and human souls.  On the interpretation 
offered above both these factors carry much weight.  Accordingly, the 
picture that emerges is optimistic as well as realistic.  By ensuring that each 
part of the soul develops in accordance with its own nature, we may aspire 
to ease the struggle within us and acquire a psychic balance – a kind of 
dynamic equilibrium between the different parts of ourselves, but not the 
elimination of our spirited and appetitive aspects in favour of reason.  In 
fact, the total suppression of spirit and appetite could never be achieved.  
For, as Socrates’ palinode suggests, the contemplative activity of the ratio-
nal element presupposes the function of extra-rational elements as well.  
Contemplation and impulse go together in all rational beings, human or 
divine.85 
 
84. This may be viewed as an important departure from the Alcibiades, in which 
Socrates contrasts the humanity of our body with the divine character of the soul. 
85. I am grateful to David Konstan, Richard McKirahan, and Marwan Rashed for their 
remarks on an earlier version of this paper.  A later version has received the benefit of sub-
stantial suggestions and criticisms by Paul Kalligas and David Sedley, and I should like to 
extend to both of them my very warm thanks.  My greatest debt is to Michel Narcy for his 
comments on successive drafts of the paper, and also for his extensive correspondence with 
me on several exegetic and philosophical points. 
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